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Abstract
The concept of net assessment has long been considered an important 
tool for American national security strategists, and the Pentagon’s Office 
of Net Assessment is widely regarded as a key influence in security plan-
ning. However, despite calls by experts for the development of a similar 
net assessment office in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
only a few tentative efforts have been made to use the concepts and 
methodologies of net assessment for the problem of ensuring American 
homeland security. This article argues that a homeland security net as-
sessment is even more necessary today, since debates over the state of 
the nation’s security involve discussions not only about the seriousness 
of the threat but also the legitimacy of the intelligence and other ef-
forts employed to combat that threat. It proposes a new model for a 
homeland security net assessment process that should be undertaken by 
DHS and suggests that such an assessment would expand the discussion 
of homeland security threats beyond terrorism and would encourage 
greater focus on civil liberties and disaster preparedness.
✵  ✵  ✵  ✵  ✵
The concept of net assessment has long been considered an important 
tool for American national-security strategists, but this tool is largely 
unavailable in the effort to analyze threats and strategies in the areas of 
homeland security and homeland defense. The Pentagon’s Office of Net 
Assessment (ONA) is famous within the American national-security 
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establishment for its influence in security planning, but many critical 
homeland security threats are outside its scope. Additionally, there is no 
equivalent net assessment office within the DHS. Despite calls by experts 
for the development of such a capability within the DHS, only a few 
tentative efforts have been made to use the concepts and methodologies 
of net assessment for ensuring US homeland security. A comprehensive 
homeland security net assessment must involve more than a detailed 
understanding of external threats. Traditionally, national-security net 
assessments focus on two key factors: the enemy and one’s own forces. 
To develop a homeland security net assessment, it is more critical to 
understand our own actions and capabilities, because those actions are 
focused within America’s borders. In the areas of homeland security 
and defense, more than in traditional national security, governmental 
actions are likely to have a direct effect on the American people and 
society. For this reason, a homeland security net assessment must focus 
not only on the threat but also on our own capabilities to counter that 
threat.
Debates over the state of the nation’s security involve discussions not 
only about the seriousness of threats from terrorism and other sources 
but also consideration of the legitimacy of the intelligence and other 
counterterrorism capabilities being employed to combat those threats. 
Of particular interest is the effect domestic intelligence programs have 
on civil liberties and domestic society. Other studies have examined the 
potential organizational structure of a DHS office of net assessment, 
so that is not the focus here.1 Instead, the article proposes a framework 
for thinking about the task of a homeland security net assessment and 
suggests a new model for the process that should be undertaken by the 
DHS in assessing the key threats to the US homeland, which are terror-
ism, cyber, and natural hazards like disasters and infectious disease. It 
begins by reviewing the concept of net assessment and how it has been 
used in the US Department of Defense (DOD). Next it examines pro-
posals for the DHS to establish an office of net assessment following the 
DOD model and then posits how the process of net assessment should 
be modified for the problem of homeland security, using a new model 
that could be adopted by the DHS. The final section offers preliminary 
suggestions and implications from such a homeland security net assess-
ment process.
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What Is Net Assessment?
The concept of net assessment arose during the Cold War, when the 
United States realized that traditional tools and systems for analyzing 
national-security challenges did not include any place or procedure for 
carefully integrating assessments of the enemy threat with an under-
standing of one’s own capabilities. Intelligence agencies and officials 
typically refrained from analyzing “blue force” capabilities, while op-
erational planners, who did understand US capabilities, could not be 
sure they were privy to the best (and often most-highly classified) intel-
ligence information on the enemy against whom they were planning. 
Additionally, there was no institutional advocate for taking a long-term, 
strategic-level approach to national-security problems; within the intel-
ligence community and the policy establishment, current problems and 
issues invariably prevented senior analysts and decision makers from be-
ing able to think about long-term goals and threats.
Net assessment is closely identified with Andrew Marshall, the founder 
and, until recently, director of the DOD’s ONA.2 Marshall and his of-
fice became famous among strategic thinkers, and several think tanks 
and analysts have adopted the net-assessment idea. A few scholars have 
suggested that net assessments should become more widely used today, 
but the concept remains relatively little known outside defense circles.3
Early in his tenure, Marshall wrote that national assessments “are 
intended to provide insight for policymakers at the highest levels by 
discovering and illuminating the nature of major national security prob-
lems.”4 The key element of a net assessment is a comparison of two 
sides in interaction with one another. In the words of Eliot Cohen, “Net 
assessment is the appraisal of military balances.”5 It might strike an ob-
server as self-evident that strategists and military planners should be tak-
ing into account assessments of both sides of a situation. After all, Sun 
Tzu famously advised that a general must “know the enemy and know 
yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”6 But in fact, 
this is only rarely done. As the authors of a Carnegie Endowment net 
assessment put it, “only a net assessment requires the analyst to have an 
understanding of the capabilities of friendly forces. Although obtaining 
an understanding of friendly forces sounds easy—especially for govern-
ment analysts—it can be anything but.”7
Although the net-assessment approach has been used most notably 
by the Pentagon, it does not focus only on military factors. The DOD 
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defines net assessment as “the comparative analysis of military, tech-
nological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative 
military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and 
opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.”8 
Most advocates of net assessment see it as a broad-based, interdisciplin-
ary approach, taking into account not only military matters but also 
economic, political, technological, and social factors.
Net assessments involve both quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Even in assessments of the military balance between two countries, 
which might lend themselves to a largely quantitative analysis, advocates 
prefer to avoid a strictly numbers-based approach. Cohen, for example, 
argued during the Cold War that it was important “to get beyond mere 
‘bean counting’” and understand how each side operated its forces. The 
focus is on the long term, identifying long-term trends and looking be-
yond the typical US government perspective that is often shaped by 
the length of a presidential administration.9 As Aaron Friedberg notes, 
“Trends are important because the past will always shape, even if it does 
not completely determine, the future.”10 Paul Bracken writes, “One of 
the greatest contributions of net assessment is that it calls for consciously 
thinking about the time span of the competition you are in.”11 In fact, 
this long-term view may be one reason why the Pentagon’s ONA has 
been seen as successful. It can be hard to criticize assessments about a 
future that is decades away.
Another key aspect of the Pentagon’s net-assessment approach—and 
another likely reason why it has been supported through so many ad-
ministrations—is that it does not produce specific policy recommenda-
tions. As one critic has put it, “It could be the case that Marshall’s ap-
proach has survived precisely because it is so oracular and nebulous.”12 
Marshall himself writes that net assessment should “aim at providing 
diagnosis of problems and opportunities, rather than recommended ac-
tions. The focus on diagnosis rather than solutions is especially signifi-
cant.”13 He explained in an interview that the need to provide policy 
prescriptions can “corrupt the analysis,” because it will tend to blur ob-
jectivity. He said, “People psychologically favor certain policies and then 
distort the analysis. In order to get [an] even handed, objective approach 
you [need] to . . . constrain it to the diagnosis problem.”14
It is often said that the Pentagon’s ONA has encouraged pessimistic 
thinking and worst-case scenarios. During the late years of the Cold 
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War, for example, Cohen argued that a net-assessment approach helped 
to demonstrate the weakness in the analysis of some authors and schol-
ars who he called optimists, who believed that the conventional mili-
tary balance in Europe at the time favored the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization rather than the Warsaw Pact.15 More recently, one critic 
has called the ONA “a full-time office of threat inflation,”16 and some 
have charged that Marshall and the ONA tend to exaggerate threats—in 
particular concerning China, which has been the subject of a great deal 
of ONA-sponsored work in recent years. Marshall acknowledged in an 
interview that “We tend to look at not very happy futures.”17
Recently the occasion of Marshall’s retirement and the publication 
of a highly favorable book about him by two former colleagues have 
generated a small flurry of articles assessing his legacy. Supporters, such 
as Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, laud him as “an intellectual 
giant comparable to such nuclear strategists as Bernard Brodie, Herman 
Kahn, Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, and Albert Wohlstetter.”18 
He has been praised for being one of the first to understand the impor-
tance of what became known as the “revolution in military affairs” and 
for warning about the rise of China long before the current administra-
tion’s pivot to Asia.19 Critics, on the other hand, argue he was far from 
all-knowing—having missed the increasing threat of terrorism prior to 
the 9/11 attacks. Critics also contend that, because most of the products 
of the ONA are classified, it is difficult to objectively assess the value of 
its work.20
The debate over Andrew Marshall’s legacy will undoubtedly con-
tinue.21 However, the continuing value of the net-assessment approach 
seems clear, especially in areas of homeland security and defense, where 
it is especially important to match our understanding of external threats 
with a clear-eyed assessment of our own internal capabilities.
The DHS and Net Assessment
There is no central office or organization in the US government re-
sponsible for producing net assessments focusing on homeland secu-
rity issues. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is chartered 
with having the primary responsibility within the US government for 
conducting net assessments of terrorist threats.22 However, its work ap-
pears to be mostly classified. Therefore, it is not known whether it con-
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ducts regular net assessments, and if it does, whether those assessments 
are useful to policy makers. Some elements of the DHS, such as the Do-
mestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), do appear to conduct net 
assessments. That office has as one of its functions the mission of per-
forming red team and net assessments.23 However, many observers have 
argued that the DHS should make greater use of net assessments and 
should establish a net assessment office similar to the Pentagon’s ONA.
In 2007, for example, the Homeland Security Advisory Council is-
sued a report calling on the DHS to “establish an Office of Net As-
sessment (ONA) within the Department to provide the Secretary with 
comprehensive analysis of future threats and U.S. capabilities to meet 
those threats.”24 That same year a report by the Heritage Foundation 
argued that the DHS should form a small, nonpartisan office of net 
assessment that would be able to focus on long-term challenges and 
help address the complaint by the 9/11 Commission and others that 
the nation suffered from a “lack of imagination.”25 A strong advocate of 
establishing a net-assessment capability within the DHS has been Frank 
J. Cilluffo, the associate vice president and director of the Center for 
Cyber and Homeland Security at The George Washington University. 
Cilluffo argues that the DHS responds to most threats reactively and has 
only a limited capability for assessing future threats: 
The ONA would fill the much-needed role of brain trust, while remaining un-
fettered by the “crisis du jour” or the day-to-day demands flowing from in-
telligence needs and operations. The ever-shifting and unpredictable security 
environment facing the United States requires the constant questioning of 
assumptions, the asking of what-ifs, and the thinking of the unthinkable, all 
in order to identify game changers. The ONA should take a comprehensive, 
multi-disciplinary approach to its analysis, looking at the full range of factors 
which will alter and shape the security environment of the future, including 
social, political, technological, economic, demographic, and other trends.26
One particular area in which a net assessment has been called for is 
bioterrorism. In 2004 the Bush administration published Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, which 
called for “a periodic senior-level policy net assessment that evaluates 
progress in implementing this policy, identifies continuing gaps or vul-
nerabilities in our biodefense posture, and makes recommendations 
for re-balancing and refining investments among the pillars of overall 
defense policy.”27 Such a net assessment was reportedly conducted, but 
it has not been publicly released.28
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Patrick Forrest and Alex Hilliker argue that because homeland threats 
and challenges such as public safety, emergency management, and law 
enforcement are largely outside the scope of the DOD, the existing 
ONA in the Pentagon is insufficient to deal with such important mat-
ters. Instead, they argue, a new office of net assessment is needed within 
the DHS to provide long-term strategic assessments of future security 
threats—without being subject to the many reporting requirements that 
are placed on existing DHS offices such as the Office of Strategic Plans. 
They write that DHS leadership has suffered from a lack of data-driven, 
long-term threat assessments, and as a result billions of dollars have been 
spent on ineffective programs such as the Secure Border Initiative Net-
work. Furthermore, they suggest that a relatively small, independent of-
fice reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security be estab-
lished, the focus of which “would be solely on producing assessments 
intended to increase the leadership’s situational awareness regarding fu-
ture challenges to the homeland security enterprise.”29
A New Net-Assessment Model for Homeland Security 
In recent years national-security leaders have frequently argued that 
the threats facing America’s security today are more challenging than 
those seen in the past. Testifying before the Senate, Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper stated, “Looking back over my now more 
than half a century in intelligence, I’ve not experienced a time when 
we’ve been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.”30 Gen 
Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified, “I 
will personally attest to the fact that it [the world] is more dangerous 
than it has ever been.”31 Some critics have charged that such dire warn-
ings are exaggerations, and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson 
has not taken quite such a pessimistic view.32 However, Johnson has 
also made it clear that the threat is serious: “The United States faces a 
constantly evolving threat environment. Thirteen years after the 9/11 
attacks, threats to our nation have not subsided.”33
What threats should be part of a homeland security net assessment? 
Clearly, one focus would be on the terrorist threat to the United States. 
Secretary Johnson has said, “The cornerstone of our mission at the 
Department of Homeland Security has been, and should continue to 
be, counterterrorism—that is, protecting the nation against terrorist at-
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tacks.”34 A focus on terrorism suggests that a homeland security net as-
sessment should compare the threat from specific groups or actors, such 
as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), with the 
counterterrorism capabilities available to combat them. Although esti-
mates of the terrorist threat are available in abundance, there appear to 
be few, if any, net assessments available that would compare the terrorist 
threat with US counterterrorism capabilities.35
Even though terrorism might be considered “job one” for home-
land security, it is neither the only threat nor the only mission for the 
homeland security enterprise.36 The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Secu-
rity Review found that terrorism is only one of several primary home-
land security concerns: “The terrorist threat is increasingly decentral-
ized and may be harder to detect. Cyber threats are growing and pose 
ever-greater concern to our critical infrastructure systems as they be-
come increasingly interdependent. Natural hazards are becoming more 
costly to address, with increasingly variable consequences due in part 
to drivers such as climate change and interdependent and aging infra-
structure.”37 These three categories of challenges—terrorism, cyber, and 
natural hazards—may provide a useful and more complete framework 
for understanding the threats that would be examined by a homeland 
security net assessment.
Few observers would be surprised by the inclusion of terrorism and 
cyber threats on this list, but some, especially those within the DOD, 
might wonder why natural hazards should be considered a key home-
land security problem. After all, the mission of providing military sup-
port to civil authorities following a natural disaster or other emergency 
is typically considered a secondary one for military planners. However, 
for homeland security planners and practitioners, disasters and other 
types of natural hazards are a primary mission—and a mission that has 
been growing in recent years, following disasters such as Hurricane Ka-
trina, super storm Sandy, and occurrences of other natural threats such 
as the outbreak of infectious disease. The Obama administration has 
acknowledged the link between natural hazards and national security. 
In the 2015 National Security Strategy the White House noted that en-
suring national security means “reinforcing our homeland security to 
keep the American people safe from terrorist attacks and natural hazards 
while strengthening our national resilience.”38
 Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Winter 2015
Erik J. Dahl
[ 70 ]
However, there is more to a net assessment than an examination of 
the threat. It must also provide decision makers with an understanding 
of our own capabilities, and this aspect is even more important in the 
area of homeland security than national security. Political scientist Rose 
McDermott has noted that the second part of Sun Tzu’s advice—the 
need to know oneself—is especially important in the field of homeland 
security: “Certainly for purposes of homeland security, recognizing our 
own gaps and failings is an important part of triumphing over our limita-
tions.”39 The adversary may not be far away in a distant land but instead 
can be here in the middle of the homeland. The capabilities developed 
to counter homeland security threats will tend to involve and affect a 
broader range of American citizens than will the military, foreign policy, 
and intelligence capabilities that are used to counter foreign threats.
A homeland security net assessment, then, might examine the threats 
from terrorism, cyber, and natural hazards and the capabilities that have 
been developed to address each of these threats. But that, too, would 
not be enough. Because homeland security efforts are directly focused 
within US borders, they must also consider the effect of those efforts on 
the American people and society. If a national-security net assessment is 
the appraisal of military balances, as Cohen described it, then a home-
land security net assessment should be the appraisal of other, equally 
important balances, such as the balance between security and liberty 
that is at the forefront of many discussions of homeland security. The 
requirement to understand the effects of our policies on the American 
people might be captured in the concept of legitimacy: are the capabili-
ties our government has developed to keep us safe seen as legitimate in 
the eyes of the people they are designed to serve?
There is nothing new in arguing that domestic and public concerns 
are critical for understanding threats and strategies. Advocates of net 
assessment often cite Clausewitz approvingly, noting his argument that 
war is an extension of politics by other means—implying that both po-
litical and military issues must be involved in conducting a true net 
assessment.40 Even more appropriate for our purposes may be what 
Clausewitz referred to as the “remarkable trinity.” This trinity has often 
been translated as the people, the army, and the government; Clausewitz 
argued that war is the product of the interaction of these three forces, 
and a strategist can only understand war by understanding all three.41
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A similar homeland security trinity may be helpful in understanding 
the forces that must be understood to conduct a homeland security net 
assessment. This trinity involves the threats, capabilities, and legitimacy 
involved in homeland security.42 Thus, our proposed homeland security 
net assessment process would examine the threat to America’s security 
in three broad categories: terrorism, cyber, and natural hazards. And for 
each threat, the assessment would examine the nature of that threat, the 
capabilities to counter the threat, and whether those capabilities are seen 
by the American people as legitimate or are seen as risking civil liberties 
or other democratic values. The next section will undertake to sketch 
out what such a homeland security net assessment might reveal.
A Preliminary Homeland Security Net Assessment
Although the Pentagon’s ONA has often been seen as a source of 
pessimistic, worst-case thinking, a homeland security net assessment 
would be most useful for policy makers if it were seen as producing ob-
jective, fact-based reports on long-range trends and issues concerning 
the most important threats facing the nation. These assessments could 
fill a niche in between the pessimistic studies often produced by out-
side critics of whichever administration is in power and the consider-
ably more optimistic reports typically issued from government agencies 
when they attempt to assess their own accomplishments. The following 
are some of the issues and problems a homeland security net assessment 
could help illuminate.
Terrorism 
America’s current domestic intelligence structure encompasses a com-
plex system that includes counterterrorism organizations led by the NCTC; 
other federal-level organizations and efforts, including those within the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the DHS, and the DOD; and 
state, local, and private-sector activities. Despite the development of these 
counterterrorism organizations and capabilities, many experts argue much 
more remains to be done, especially in terms of coordinating federal efforts 
with those of state, local, and private entities. A recent report by a panel 
of experienced practitioners and scholars argues that, “The United States 
still lacks a cohesive domestic counterterrorism strategy with the capacity 
for coordinated execution at all levels of government.”43 Even though 
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the threat from al-Qaeda has declined, the overall terrorist threat today 
remains high, with a broad range of groups and individuals continuing 
to pose significant threats to American lives at home and abroad. Some 
experts believe the terrorist threat is greater today than it was in the im-
mediate post-9/11 period, but the growing consensus is that while the 
threat of another catastrophic attack appears reduced, there remains a 
continuing threat of smaller-scale plots and attacks from al-Qaeda affili-
ates and homegrown extremists.44
In its analysis of the terrorist threat facing the United States, a home-
land security net assessment would need to take a broad, long-range 
view. It must also consider the impact of more recent events such as the 
death of Osama bin Laden, the upheaval of the Arab Spring, and the 
rise of ISIL.45 The last National Intelligence Estimate written (or at least 
made public) on the terrorist threat to the United States was in 2007, 
suggesting that a new assessment is overdue. Such an assessment might 
reflect the conventional view among terrorism experts that al-Qaeda has 
been weakened in recent years, largely as a result of the counterterrorism 
efforts that have been undertaken by the United States and its allies since 
2001. A recent report by the Bipartisan Policy Center describes some of 
these improved capabilities:
For example, on 9/11, there were 16 people on the U.S. “no fly” list. Today, 
there are more than 40,000. In 2001, there were 32 Joint Terrorism Task Force 
“fusion centers,” where multiple law enforcement agencies work together to 
chase down leads and build terrorism cases. Now there are 103. A decade ago, 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Cen-
ter, Transportation Security Administration, Northern Command, and Cyber 
Command didn’t exist. In 2014, all of these new post-9/11 institutions make it 
much harder for terrorists to operate in the United States.46
An assessment will also need to consider the rising threat from lone-
wolf terrorists and other homegrown extremists. It could examine the 
quantitative data that is available on such threats. As Secretary Johnson 
has said, “This is the type of threat that may be hardest to detect. It in-
volves independent actors potentially living in the United States, with 
easy access to items that, in the wrong hands, can become tools for mass 
violence.”47 The New America Foundation, for example, has found that 
homegrown jihadist extremists have killed 26 people since 9/11, while 
non-jihadist extremists have killed 39.48 However, the assessment would 
also have to wrestle with more difficult questions about how to measure 
and compare different kinds of threats facing the nation. For example, 
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during the same week in which the Boston Marathon bombings killed 
three people, a fertilizer plant exploded in West, Texas, killing 14. The 
Boston bombings received much more media attention, but a net as-
sessment might consider whether the risks from industrial accidents or 
other kinds of disasters represent a greater homeland security threat than 
terrorism. An example of such a perspective can be found in the work 
of Brian Jenkins, who has noted that the level of terrorist violence in the 
United States during the past decade has been considerably less than 
that experienced during the 1970s, “when there were 50 to 60 terrorist 
bombings a year in the United States.”49 That statistic is likely to come as 
a surprise to most Americans, and one task for a net assessment would be 
to determine how significant such historical comparisons are for today.
One of the most important developments has been the establishment 
of a network of 78 state and local intelligence fusion centers, which 
typically receive DHS funding and support but are under local control. 
These fusion centers are not widely known, but they have had some 
notable successes in helping to prevent terrorist attacks and assisting law 
enforcement agencies in capturing criminals.50 They have also generated 
controversy. A Senate committee report found that fusion centers “often 
produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting to 
DHS, and many produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever.”51 A 
RAND study examined fusion centers and the FBI-led Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces and reported, “What we found was organized chaos: a feder-
ally subsidized, loosely coordinated system for sharing information that 
is collected according to varying local standards with insufficient qual-
ity control, accountability, or oversight.”52 However, other experts and 
studies have argued that state and local fusion centers are a vital part of 
the homeland security enterprise, and a net assessment would be useful 
in asking questions such as, is 78 the right number of these centers?53
Some of the most important changes in counterterrorism capabilities 
have been improvements in domestic intelligence at the federal, state, 
and local levels. As Brian Jenkins notes, homeland security intelligence 
is likely to become even more important in the coming years: “Domes-
tic intelligence collection is essential, especially as al Qaeda places more 
emphasis on inspiring local volunteers to take action.”54 Additionally, 
the intelligence gathered to detect such threats will almost inevitably 
need to sweep up information on American citizens who are not, them-
selves, threats. Gregory Treverton writes, “Today, it’s not enough to 
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know about them; intelligence can’t understand them without know-
ing a lot about ‘us.’”55 A homeland security net assessment might argue 
that in evaluating domestic intelligence programs, we should follow the 
same standard as the US Food and Drug Administration in determining 
whether drugs can be marketed: they need to be both safe and effective. 
This would mean that for counterterrorism intelligence programs to be 
judged legitimate and worthwhile, a program needs to be both effective 
in preventing terrorist attacks and sufficiently safe for civil liberties and 
personal freedoms.
Some of the most controversial American counterterrorism capabili-
ties—such as the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk data-collection 
programs that were revealed by Edward Snowden—may not pass this 
test. Not only is the legitimacy of these programs in question but also 
there is considerable debate over whether they are effective in prevent-
ing terrorism. Intelligence community leaders have claimed these pro-
grams are necessary for national security, but two official studies, by the 
President’s Review Group and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, argued that at least one program—the collection of American 
phone data—had not been useful. Outside researchers have also found 
that bulk collection of phone data has not prevented a single terrorist 
attack.56 The most effective domestic counterterrorism tools have been 
traditional law enforcement techniques such as the use of undercover 
officers and informants and close engagement with the local community 
to encourage tips from the public and from family members of those 
who might be at risk of radicalization.57
Finally, a net assessment would closely examine the legitimacy of 
American counterterrorism capabilities. One of the most important—
and most controversial—of these capabilities is the use of unmanned 
drone strikes. Many critics of American policy view these strikes—often 
resulting in civilian casualties, including recently two hostages held by 
al-Qaeda—as illegitimate.58 The rules governing drone use are not well 
understood by the public, and as the Bipartisan Policy Center writes, 
“The choices the United States makes regarding its use of drones for tar-
geting killing operations and the rules that regulate such operations will 
shape the global environment in the coming decades.”59
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Cyber
Estimates of the threat from cyberterrorism range from the extremely 
dire to the moderately sanguine. Some scholars and computer-security 
experts argue that the nation faces the threat of a “cyber Pearl Harbor,”60 
while others claim threats of cyberwar are little more than a myth.61 
Former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano warned that a 
“cyber 9/11” could happen “imminently.”62 On the other hand, a clas-
sified national intelligence assessment in 2013 concluded that cyber-
espionage, most notably from China, represented a greater threat to the 
nation’s security than cyberterrorism.63 And in his latest testimony to 
Congress, Director Clapper said the likelihood of a catastrophic “Cyber 
Armageddon” is remote.64
A net assessment could be especially useful in helping to advance the 
debate over the different kinds of cyber threats facing the nation. The 
Bipartisan Policy Center recently argued that a different approach is 
needed: “Overall, the cybersecurity debate has matured but does not yet 
sufficiently distinguish among the various threats. The next step must be 
a more nuanced approach to address this problem and a more careful use 
of terms—especially ‘cyber attack,’ ‘cyber war,’ and ‘cyberterrorism.’ ”65
A net assessment, taking a long-term view and making use of available 
data on specific cyber threats, would likely conclude, as Colin Gray has 
written, “Despite the acute shortage of careful strategic thought on the 
subject, and notwithstanding the ‘Cybergeddon’ catastrophe scenarios 
that sell media products, it is clear enough today that the sky is not fall-
ing because of cyber peril.”66 It seems likely that a net assessment would 
adopt the relatively cautious approach taken by terrorism expert Martha 
Crenshaw, who notes that the most disruptive cyber attacks, such as the 
Stuxnet virus used against Iranian centrifuges, have been the work of 
sophisticated state actors—not terrorist groups or individuals.67
Just as the debate over the cyber threat is relatively new and under-
developed, the discussion of cyber capabilities is also at a fairly un-
developed stage. The US military has established a Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM), as a four-star subunified command under the US 
Strategic Command, with the mission of directing DOD cyber opera-
tions and defending military information networks. The commander 
of USCYBERCOM also serves as director of the NSA, an intelligence 
organization that provides support to military and national customers, 
including USCYBERCOM.68 Some critics worry the United States may 
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be combining too much military and civilian authority into one organi-
zation. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution said, “The mashing to-
gether of the NSA and Cyber Command has blurred the lines between 
a military command and a national spy agency.”69 Other critics argue 
more needs to be done, such as creating a US Cyber Force that would 
operate alongside the existing military services.70 Richard Clarke, who 
has been an outspoken advocate for concern about cyber threats, ar-
gues the United States needs to urgently develop greater cyber-defense 
capabilities: “If anything is clear, it is that we have a remarkably well-
developed offensive capability, but no commensurately serious com-
mitment to defense. There is neither a plan nor any capability to de-
fend America’s civilian infrastructure, from banking to telecoms to 
aviation.”71
In recent years it seems as if just about everybody in the national 
security and intelligence communities has jumped on the cyber band-
wagon, with other new cyber organizations including the Cyber Threat 
Intelligence Integration Center under the director of national intelli-
gence, a new cyber directorate at the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
under the DHS. However, it is not clear if we have determined the 
proper “lanes in the road” for these different organizations. The history 
of the DHS suggests that once major organizational reforms have been 
made in government, it can be difficult to change course. The DHS 
often ranks low on surveys of federal government-employee satisfaction 
and is often criticized for being too big to manage effectively. Although 
it has undergone several reorganizations since it was first established, it is 
still largely as it was originally designed. The force of path dependence is 
strong in government organizations, and a homeland security net assess-
ment would help us realize that the cybersecurity organizations we are 
establishing today are likely to be around for many years. It is important 
to think carefully from the beginning about how to deconflict responsi-
bilities and avoid creating stovepipes.
Because cyber issues directly affect virtually all Americans, it is par-
ticularly important that a broad net assessment perspective, acknowl-
edging the concerns of stakeholders beyond the traditional national 
security establishment, inform cyber strategies. The Pentagon un-
derstands that the problem of cybersecurity cannot be addressed by 
military personnel alone and is planning to create a “surge force” of 
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private-sector and National Guard cyber experts who could be called 
upon to help protect critical infrastructure sectors in case of a national 
cyber emergency.72 Eric Rosenbach, the assistant secretary of defense 
for homeland defense and global security, has said the DOD is com-
mitted to a whole-of-government approach to cybersecurity, including 
close coordination with other federal agencies, state and local govern-
ments, and the private sector.73 As Adm Michael Rogers, commander 
of USCYBERCOM and director of NSA, puts it, “Neither the U.S. 
government, the states, nor the private sector can defend their informa-
tion systems on their own against the most powerful cyber forces. The 
public and private sectors need one another’s help.”74
A net assessment of America’s cybersecurity would likely conclude 
that more work needs to be done to gauge the effect of increased cy-
ber capabilities on civil liberties. As a National Research Council re-
port noted, effective programs to deter viruses and other malware from 
Internet traffic may require the traffic to be inspected by a third party, 
which raises important privacy issues.75 Additionally, from a homeland 
security perspective, one of the weaker areas of public policy may be at 
the level of state and local authorities. It appears the most significant cy-
ber capabilities exist either at the level of the federal government, where 
most policies originate, or in the private sector, where most research and 
development is conducted. Some significant state and local efforts are 
underway, but more must be done, and a homeland security net assess-
ment could help suggest areas of focus below the federal level.76
Natural Hazards
The disasters of Hurricane Katrina and super storm Sandy ensured 
that threats from natural hazards remain near the top of the list of home-
land security concerns facing the nation. According to the Quadren-
nial Homeland Security Review, “Natural disasters, pandemics, and the 
trends associated with climate change continue to present a major area 
of homeland security risk.”77 The greatest natural-hazard risk, the review 
argues, is of a devastating pandemic, and the 2014 Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa provides support for that view.78 However, the threat re-
mains high from other kinds of natural disasters, including hurricanes, 
earthquakes, droughts, and floods, with the DHS noting the increasing 
risk as the nation’s infrastructure ages and as climate change may act as 
a “threat multiplier.”79
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A homeland security net assessment would weigh such threats against 
the capabilities that have been developed to prepare for and respond to 
them. The DHS argues that the nation’s capability to respond to natural 
hazards and disasters has improved significantly since Katrina: “Acting 
on the lessons of Hurricane Katrina, we have improved disaster plan-
ning with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well 
as nongovernmental organizations and the private sector; pre-positioned 
a greater number of resources; and strengthened the Nation’s ability to 
respond to disasters in a quick and robust fashion. Seven years after Ka-
trina, the return on these investments showed in the strong, coordinated 
response to Hurricane Sandy.”80
The US government has developed a sophisticated national prepared-
ness system, including a National Preparedness Goal that sets out 31 core 
national capabilities and a National Preparedness Report that summarizes 
the progress made in achieving those core capabilities.81 Most experts 
agree the nation is better prepared for disasters than it has been in the 
past.82 However, an area where more work needs to be done, and where 
a net assessment could be particularly useful, is in determining how 
effective these preparedness capabilities really are. The Government Ac-
countability Office found that, “DHS and FEMA [Federal Emergency 
Management Agency] have implemented a number of efforts with the 
goal of measuring preparedness by assessing capabilities and addressing 
related challenges, but success has been limited.”83
A number of scholars and homeland security practitioners have warned 
in recent years about the danger of what Paul Stockton, former assistant 
secretary of defense for homeland defense and Americas’ security af-
fairs, calls “catastrophes more severe than Hurricane Katrina.”84 Such 
disasters are sometimes called complex catastrophes, “black swans,” or 
“wicked problems,” and they appear to be increasing in frequency and 
seriousness.85 An example that is often cited of such a potential catas-
trophe is an earthquake along the New Madrid fault, near the town of 
New Madrid, Missouri. An estimated magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck 
that region in 1812, killing few people in what was then an underpopu-
lated area but causing tremendous shocks that collapsed the banks of 
the Mississippi River and liquefied the ground. Experts estimate that 
86,000 people could be killed if a similar earthquake hits that area to-
day.86 FEMA conducted a National Level Exercise in 2011 focused on 
A Homeland Security Net Assessment
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Winter 2015 [ 79 ]
the New Madrid threat, and a homeland security net assessment would 
be able to examine this type of high-impact but low-probability event.
Although it might not seem obvious that legitimacy is an important 
factor in ensuring homeland security against natural hazards, public ac-
ceptance of and support for government efforts may be more important 
in this area than any other. This is because local, public, and private-
sector involvement is critically important in preparing for and respond-
ing to natural hazards and disasters. The DHS Strategic Plan argues that 
a “whole community approach” is necessary “to build the capacity of 
American society to be resilient in the face of disruptions, disasters, and 
other crises.”87 A homeland security net assessment would evaluate how 
successful the DHS has been in engaging the American public and other 
stakeholders in the effort to prepare for natural hazards and catastrophes.
Conclusion
This very preliminary review suggests that in the area of terrorism, 
there is currently a favorable—but tenuous—balance of threat and 
homeland security capabilities that has, thus far, succeeded in keeping 
America safer than most experts would have predicted after the 9/11 
attacks. America’s global counterterrorism efforts and domestic law en-
forcement and intelligence systems appear to have been successful in 
increasing security within the United States, as demonstrated by numer-
ous foiled terrorist plots and the lack of another major successful attack 
on American soil since 9/11.
However, these gains have come at the cost of increasing domestic 
surveillance and at the risk of infringing upon civil liberties. By its very 
nature, domestic and homeland security intelligence is intrusive and 
risks impinging on civil liberties. As then-Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity Michael Chertoff put it, “Intelligence, as you know, is not only 
about spies and satellites. Intelligence is about the thousands and thou-
sands of routine, everyday observations and activities. Surveillances, 
interactions—each of which may be taken in isolation as not a particu-
larly meaningful piece of information, but when fused together, gives 
us a sense of the patterns and the flow that really is at the core of what 
intelligence analysis is really about.”88
These thousands of observations are largely about people and events 
in America and, in the years since 9/11, the United States has created a 
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domestic intelligence system to collect them. In some cases the people 
are terrorists or other types of criminals, and the intelligence collected 
has helped to prevent bad events from happening. However, in many 
cases these observations—this domestic intelligence—is about routine 
activities undertaken by ordinary Americans and others who do not in-
tend to cause harm.89 A net assessment would examine whether these in-
telligence and counterterrorism capabilities are “safe and effective” and 
whether they are sufficiently legitimate or if they should be reexamined.
A net assessment would also be valuable in expanding the discussion 
of homeland security threats beyond terrorism. Looking at the balance 
among threat, capability, and legitimacy suggests more attention must 
be devoted to the impact of increased cyber capabilities on civil liberties 
and on the need for greater cyber-defense capabilities at the state and 
local levels. It also might highlight the need to develop better tools for 
measuring the nation’s preparedness efforts to deal with natural disasters 
and with the potentially greater threat of complex catastrophes. Addi-
tionally, whenever possible, the products of such net assessments should 
be made unclassified and widely available. This is the right thing to do, 
because Americans deserve to know as much as can reasonably be shared 
about the actions their government is taking. It is also the strategic thing 
to do, because homeland security efforts are most effective when they are 
supported and trusted by the people they serve.
A final important step would be to look farther into the future, as 
net-assessment analysts in the Pentagon did during the Cold War. Paul 
Bracken notes that thinkers using the concept of net assessment were 
able to identify the importance of Asia as an area of strategic concern 
and competition as early as the 1980s, despite the fact that the only im-
mediate problem of Asian security at that time was Korea.90 The com-
parable question for today might revolve around what the rising threats 
and concerns for homeland security are not simply for the next few years 
but also for the next several decades.
In recent years we have seen a few, mostly tentative calls for the use of 
net assessment tools in determining and weighing the threats to Amer-
ica’s homeland security. However, as we continue to face an increasing 
variety of challenges in an era of decreasing budgets and government 
retrenchment, these tools may be more useful than ever. As a first step, 
the DHS should establish an office of net assessment and direct it to 
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conduct a broad-based study of the threats from terrorism, cyber, and 
natural hazards. 
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